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A New Concept of Corporations: A
Contractual and Private Property
Model
By ROBERT HESSEN*
introduction: The Concession Theory and Views of Corporate
Legitimacy
The Concession Theory
In 1906 the Supreme Court declared, "[T]he corporation is a crea-
ture of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of
the public."' Known as the "concession theory," this view holds that
incorporation requires governmental permission or authorization, and
that through its charter a corporation receives various special privileges
that only a government can create and confer, such as limited liability.
These "special privileges" allegedly give a corporation an advantage in
competition with noncorporate businesses, such as partnerships; hence,
corporations are more likely to survive, grow, and reap profits. In ex-
change, however, the corporation is expected to display a sense of "so-
cial responsibility," that is, to place public service ahead of private
profit.
This viewpoint is reflected in Professor Willard F. Mueller's com-
ment, "Most Americans seem to have forgotten. . . that business cor-
porations are created and survive only as a special privilege of the state
."2 and in Professor Robert Dahl's observation:
[I]t is absurd to regard the corporation simply as an enterprise estab-
lished for the sole purpose of allowing profit-making. One has sim-
ply to ask: Why should citizens, through their government, grant
special rights, powers, privileges, and protections to any firm except
on the understanding that its activities are to fulfill their purposes?
* B.A., 1958, Queens College; M.A., 1959, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1969, Colum-
bia University. Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, and Lecturer, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University.
1. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906).
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1971, at 63, col. 1.
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Corporations exist because we allow them to do So.3
The importance of the concession theory can hardly be overstated.
It is a tenet of orthodox legal theory, accepted as a self-evident truth by
people of all political persuasions. Those who are hostile to corpora-
tions, however, put it to special use. When critics demand, for exam-
ple, that Congress compel corporations to adopt a new system of
internal decision-making, the obvious question is: Why do the critics
believe that government has any legal or moral right to dictate the in-
ternal structure of a private business? The reason they offer is that a
corporation, unlike any other form of organization or association, is a
"creature of the state." From this basic premise, they conclude that
corporations must submit to whatever constraints or demands govern-
ment may choose to impose on them.
The concession theory contains an important corollary-the idea
that corporations are "fictitious legal persons" or "artificial legal enti-
ties" distinct from their owners and officers. At first glance, this idea
may seem innocuous, with no political or policy implications. The con-
trary, however, is true because critics of corporations use this "entity"
idea in asserting that corporations have no rights. Rights, after all, ap-
ply to individuals or groups of individuals (such as partnerships) but
not to imaginary "entities." Hence, many people are puzzled and
others protest that an "entity" or "fictitious legal person" is accorded
the same substantive and procedural safeguards that apply to individu-
als under the fourteenth amendment. The concession theory and its
corollary, the entity idea, are applied to all corporations regardless of
their size or whether the shares are privately held or publicly traded.
The Illegitimacy of Corporations
There is a second major premise in the contemporary view of cor-
porations-one that applies only to giant corporations whose shares are
publicly traded, namely, that they are illegitimate. This claim is made
not only by socialists but also by defenders of capitalism. For example,
Professor Irving Kristol declares that "the trouble with the large corpo-
ration today is that it does not possess a clear theoretical-i.e. ideologi-
cal-legitimacy" within the framework of capitalism. He believes that
neither the founding fathers nor Adam Smith would understand or ap-
prove of the giant corporations that exist today: "[T]hey would have
asked themselves the same questions we have been asking ourselves for
3. Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA II (R.
Nader & M. Green eds. 1973).
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almost a century now: Who 'owns' this new leviathan? Who governs
it-and by what right, and according to what principles? ' 4
Kristol's viewpoint derives from The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property, written in 1932 by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C.
Means. It is the single most influential book ever written about corpo-
rations and one whose central thesis continues to dominate contempo-
rary discussion. Berle and Means contended that during the twentieth
century the increase in the number of shareholders, each owning only a
few shares, enabled officers to usurp control in corporations whose
shares are publicly traded. The shareholders lose or surrender control
over their wealth, and the officers gain control of wealth that they per-
sonally do not own. This separation of ownership and control alleg-
edly means that giant corporations are not private property and, hence,
do not deserve to be treated or protected by government as private
property.
According to Berle and Means,
[T]he owners of passive property [i.e., shares], by surrendering con-
trol and responsibility over the active property [i.e., assets], have sur-
rendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their
sole interest,--they have released the community from the obligation
to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict
property rights.5
Berle and Means did not recommend that the officers run the corpora-
tion on their own behalf; instead, "[tihe control groups have ...
cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the
owners or the control. They have placed the community in a position
to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or
the control but all society."'6 Although they did not coin the phrase
"social responsibility," Berle and Means certainly supported and lent
justification to the idea that the primary obligation of a giant corpora-
tion is to serve society rather than to make profits for its owners and
officers.
A Contractual and Private Property Model
The concession theory and the Berle thesis are the two major
premises held by those who now advocate "social responsibility" and
who urge or seek to justify greater federal and state control over giant
corporations. If these premises stand unchallenged, they endanger
4. Kristol, On Corporate Capialism in America, PUB. INT. No. 41, 124, 125, 137 (1975).
5. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 355
(1932) [hereinafter cited as BERLE & MEANS].
6. Id. at 355-56.
May 1979]
whatever degree of autonomy today's giant corporations still possess.
The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to analyze these tenets and to
offer an alternative: a contractual and private property model of the
giant publicly traded corporation.
The contract model holds that a corporation is simply and literally
a voluntary association of individuals, united by a network of contracts,
who are entitled to exactly the same rights and legal protections as all
other individuals and organizations. It holds that corporations are not
the recipients of special privileges, that they do not require governmen-
tal permission to exist, and that their "charters" do not contain any
promise (express or implied) to place public service ahead of private
profit.
In answer to the questions, "Who 'owns' this leviathan? Who gov-
erns it-and by what right, and according to what principles?" the
property and contract model holds that the shareholders own it, the
officers make major decisions without consulting the owners, and yet
this relationship is perfectly unobjectionable because it rests upon the
principles of choice, consent, and contractual authorization.
Now we must examine each of these issues in detail.
Examining the Concession Theory
Creating Corporate Features by Contract
How would one make a case to support the idea that corporations
receive "special privileges" from government and, thus, are "creatures
of the state"? This idea is allegedly supported by showing that corpora-
tions possess features that other types of business organizations (such as
partnerships) do not possess and that these features cannot be created
by contractual agreement. The three corporate features invariably
cited are entity status, perpetual duration, and limited liability. But are
they, in fact, state-created privileges?
First, consider entity status. A corporation can sue and be sued in
its own name, but a partnership cannot; unless authorized by law, a
partnership can sue only in the name of its individual owners. The
reason for this difference is that a partnership, in Anglo-American legal
theory, is considered to be an aggregate, an association of individuals
acting together to pursue a common goal. By contrast, a corporation is
held to be something entirely different: an entity, a fictitious legal per-
son, an artificial legal being, existing independently of its individual
owners. The ability of a corporation to sue in its own name is an im-
mense convenience that results from the fact that the law views a cor-
1330 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
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poration as a distinct entity. Presumably, this point supports the belief
that entity status is a state-created privilege.
Second, consider perpetual life. A partnership automatically dis-
solves whenever one of the general partners dies, goes bankrupt, be-
comes insane, is expelled, or wishes to withdraw. Terms like
"transient," "ephemeral," and "short-lived" are often used to describe
partnerships. By contrast, a corporation is called "immortal" or "eter-
nal" because, as a distinct entity, it continues to exist despite changes in
the ranks of its owners, and because the law permits the founders of a
corporation to specify "perpetual duration" in the articles of incorpora-
tion. Thus, "immortality" also seems to be a privilege conferred by the
state.
Third, consider limited liability. Partners (like sole proprietors)
incur unlimited personal liability for the business' debts. In contrast, if
a corporation cannot meet its debt obligations to outside creditors, the
shareholders cannot be assessed to make up the deficit. What accounts
for this important difference? By law, a corporation is an entity distinct
from the shareholders, so it contracts debts in its own name. Hence,
"they" (the owners) are not responsible for "its" (the corporation's)
debts.
A Contractual Explanation
These three fundamental differences between partnerships and
corporations seem to prove that a corporation receives special privi-
leges from government. However, another way to explain entity status,
perpetual duration, and limited liability is as features created by
contract.
Entity status means that a corporation can sue and be sued as a
unit, instead of having to specify the name of every shareholder. It also
means that a corporation can hold legal title to property despite
changes in the ranks of its shareholders. If a privilege means a favor or
immunity bestowed by law upon one party at the expense of another,
then entity status cannot be classified as a privilege. As Professor Berle
noted, "More accurately, the associates are granted a legal conven-
ience, in that they may use the courts without writing the name of every
shareholder into their papers."'7 If this convenience is considered a
privilege, then it is neutralized, for, as Berle noted, "The reverse proc-
ess--that of liability to be sued under a single name, is manifestly not
advantageous to them, but is rather a measure of fairness to their
7. Id. at 128 n.2.
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opponents."'8
Moreover, entity status is an optional feature for all unincorpo-
rated businesses, including partnerships, limited partnerships, and
trusts. The owners can designate trustees to represent them in lawsuits
and to accept or convey title to property on their behalf. Possessing
entity status, then, is clearly not unique to corporations, nor a one-sided
advantage, nor a state-created privilege.
Likewise, it is inaccurate to call perpetual duration a special privi-
lege conferred by government. It simply means that the articles of in-
corporation need not be renewed, unless the founders originally
specified that the enterprise was to exist only for a fixed period of time.
The "privilege" of perpetuity certainly does not guarantee that a corpo-
ration will continue in business forever-witness the fact that more
than half of all corporate ventures fail and go out of existence within
five years of their inception. On the other hand, while partnerships are
not automatically "immortal," many firms-of attorneys, accountants,
architects, and stockbrokers, to mention a few-have been in existence
continuously for a century or more.
If they choose to do so, partners can make their enterprise "im-
mortal" by providing in a continuity agreement that the firm will not
be liquidated when one of the general partners dies or withdraws. Af-
ter outlining a variety of means by which partners can assure the con-
tinuity of their enterprise, Professor Alan R. Bromberg writes, "By
skillful use of agreements, partnerships can be given virtually any de-
sired degree of continuity."9 So much for the illusion that government
confers immortality upon corporations, while partnerships cannot
achieve a permanent, unlimited existence.
Finally, we must analyze limited liability, the most controversial
and least understood corporate feature. How can it be explained except
as a state-created privilege? Limited liability actually derives from an
implied contract between the corporate owners and their creditors. As
Professor Berle observed, "A clause could be put in every contract by
which the apposite party [i.e., the creditor] limited his right of recovery
to the common fund: the incorporation act may fairly be construed as
legislating into all corporate contracts an implied clause to that
effect."' 0
Contrary to popular belief, limited liability does not discriminate
8. Id.
9. A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 516 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG].
10. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 128 n.2.
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against creditors for the benefit of shareholders. Outsiders cannot be
compelled to extend credit to a corporation on a limited liability basis.
They can, and often do, insist that one or several of the shareholders
become personal guarantors or sureties for the debt. This fact explains
why limited liability is often an illusory feature for a new or unstable
corporate enterprise.' 1 When creditors do accept limited liability, they
do so, as Professor Berle noted, by means of an implied contract. Be-
cause creditors have a choice in the matter, limited liability cannot be
viewed as a state-created privilege that benefits the corporation at the
expense of the creditor.
Limited Liability for Torts
How, if at all, can limited liability for torts be integrated into a
contractual theory of corporations, as tort victims do not agree to limit
their claims to the assets of the corporation? The answer is it
can't-and it needn't be. The question poses the false dilemma that
limited liability for torts either is a state-created privilege or is contrac-
tual (which it obviously is not). In fact, there is a third possibility.
We must first examine how the rules of tort liability originated.
Many centuries ago in England the courts laid down the doctrine of
respondeat superior-let the master be answerable for the acts of the
servant. This principle of vicarious liability is based on the premise
that the servant commits the tort while engaged in some activity on
behalf of the master (for example, injuring a pedestrian while driving
the master's carriage),' and that the servant is personally hired, in-
structed, and supervised by the master. By holding masters fully liable
for the torts committed by their servants, the courts gave the tort victim
someone solvent (a "deep pocket") to sue for damages. Equally impor-
tant, however, the courts gave notice to masters that they must carefully
choose and closely supervise their servants, or else bear the financial
consequences of their failure to do so.' 2
Subsequently, the principle of vicarious liability was extended to
sole proprietors and to general partners on the assumption that they
personally select and monitor their employees and agents. While this
extension was reasonable, it does not automatically follow that the
same principle should be extended to corporate shareholders. Vicari-
ous liability should apply only to shareholders who play an active role
11. BROMBERG, supra note 9, at 29, 127; C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND
OTHER BusmEssS ENTERPRISES 213 (1967).
12. F. KEMPIN & J. WIESEN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 172,
450-51 (1976); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 458-59 (4th ed. 1971).
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in managing the enterprise or in selecting and supervising its employees
and agents. The tort liability of inactive shareholders ought to be the
same as that of limited partners, that is, limited to the amount invested.
The same rationale applies to both because inactive shareholders and
limited partners contribute capital but do not participate actively in
management and control.
Applying the principle of vicarious liability, the proper rule would
impose personal liability for the torts of agents and employees on who-
ever controls a business, regardless of its legalform. Thus, in partner-
ships vicarious liability would fall upon the general partners only,
while in corporations the officers would be liable (whether or not they
also happen to be owner-investors or are only hired managers). Gen-
eral partners and corporate officers may protect themselves through
careful selection and close supervision of personnel and the purchase of
liability insurance.
The argument presented here, that a corporation's limited liability
for torts is not a state-created privilege, should not be construed as an
attempt to lessen corporations' tort liabilities, nor as advocacy of pref-
erential treatment for corporations. Corporations should not be re-
lieved of any of the responsibilities or liabilities that apply to
individuals or to other organizations, either business or nonbusiness.
Instead, corporations should be held to exactly the same rules of liabil-
ity and the same standards of conduct and accountability that apply to
everyone else, nothing less and nothing more.' 3
The Entity Idea
Thus far this Article has argued that three corporate features usu-
ally regarded as state-created privileges-the capacity to sue and be
sued as a separate entity, perpetual duration, and limited liability for
debts-are actually created by contract. As such, it is unnecessary to
view a corporation as an imaginary entity. Further, the entity idea is
not needed to account for limited liability for torts, because the rule of
vicarious liability should not apply to inactive investors, whether they
be limited partners or corporate shareholders. These conclusions raise
another question: Does the entity idea serve any valid purpose, or can
it be discarded? Before answering, it is worth examining how the entity
concept gained prominence. 14
13. For an analysis of limited liability, both for debts and torts, in relation to one-
owner corporations and close corporations, see the author's book, R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE
OF THE CORPORATION (1979).
14. For an analysis of the medieval concept of the corporate entity, see id.
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In America, the source of the idea that a corporation is a distinct
entity was Chief Justice John Marshall's 1819 dictum that "[a] corpora-
tion is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law."' 15 His statement still serves as a leading definition
of a corporation and is widely quoted in judicial opinions and legal
treatises. Nonetheless, Marshall's definition is defective because it fails
to indicate how corporations differ from partnerships or other forms of
business organization. It also is confusing because it is metaphorical,
not literal; it makes a corporation sound like a hallucination, a legal
pink elephant.
Many writers have attempted to reformulate Marshall's definition
in nonmetaphorical language. One recent attempt states, "A corpora-
tion. . . is a fictitious legal person. . . .In the eyes of the law, there-
fore, the group has an existence which is independent of that of its
individual members."' 16 Another scholar, after surveying numerous at-
tempts to revise Marshall's definition, reports that they all are "per-
vaded by the notion of a 'body' or an 'entity' or an 'artificial legal
creation,' the continuance of which does not depend on that of the
component persons, and the being or existence of which is owed to an
act of state."' 17
Despite the fact that a partnership is considered to be an aggre-
gate, an association of individuals, while a corporation is viewed as an
entity existing apart from its individual members, this distinction is not
a valid one. Every organization, regardless of its legal form or features,
consists only of individuals. A group or association is only a concept, a
mental construct, used to classify different types of relationshps between
individuals. Whether the relationship is a marriage, a partnership, a
team, a crowd, a choir, a corps de ballet, or a corporation, one fact
remains constant: the concept denotes the relationship between indi-
viduals and has no referent apart from it. In a marriage, for example,
there are two individuals whose relationship is designated by the con-
cepts of husband and wife. There is no need to posit or invent an artifi-
cial entity to represent "the marriage" or to account for the fact that, in
the eyes of the law, the husband and wife are regarded as a unit for
some purposes (community property, for example). If a census-taker
was to enumerate three individuals-two real (husband and wife) and
15. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
16. Bruchey, Corporatiotr Historical.Development, in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC OR-
DER 140 (A. Chandler, S. Bruchey & L. Galambos eds. 1968).
17. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 31 (rev. ed.
1974).
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one "fictitious legal entity" ("the couple" or "the marriage")-the error
would be obvious. This kind of error, however, goes unrecognized
when the subject is corporations.
The term "corporation" actually means a group of individuals
who engage in a particular type of contractual relationship with each
other. To designate their relationship as a "corporation" is, as Frederic
W. Maitland noted in 1900, "a mere labour-saving device, like stenog-
raphy or the mathematician's symbols."18 Instead of describing the in-
tricate details of their relationship, which would be tedious and time
consuming, a shorthand symbol, a concept, is substituted. The use of
the corporate symbol, however, should not be allowed to obscure the
fact that when rights are imputed to a corporation, the referents are
actually the rights of its individual members.
Describing corporations as "entities" obscures the fact that they
actually are associations of human beings. As Professor Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld observed:
[T]ransacting business under the forms, methods and procedure per-
taining to so-called corporations is simply another mode by which
individuals or natural persons can enjoy their property and engage in
business. Just as several individuals may transact business collec-
tively as partners, so they may as members of a corporation-the
corporation being nothing more than an association of such
individuals. 19
The Corporate Charter
State Creation.- An Invalid Theory
There seem to be two weapons left in the concession theorist's ar-
senal: that a corporation requires governmental permission to exist,
and that a corporation is granted a charter in return for an implied
promise to place public service ahead of private profit. The strongest
statement of this claim was made by Ralph Nader in 1973: "In order to
exist it [a corporation] must obtain a charter. A corporate charter is in
effect an agreement whereby a government gives the corporate entity
existence and that entity, in return, agrees to serve the public
interest."2 0
What Nader calls a charter is actually the articles of incorporation,
which have nothing whatever to do with state permission or authoriza-
18. Maitland, Introduction, in 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE
xxiv (1900).
19. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 285, 288 (1909) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in the original).
20. Nader & Green, The Casefor Federal Charters, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1973, at 173.
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tion or any corporate promise to serve "the public interest." The arti-
cles actually contain certain purely factual information: the name of
the business; the intended duration (which may be a specified number
of years rather than "perpetual"); the purpose of the business; the
number of shares to be issued and the voting rights if more than one
class of stock is to be created; the amount of capital to be paid in before
the business commences; the name of the registered agent; the number
and identity of the first group of directors, and the names of the three
or more incorporators. Nothing else is required in the articles.
When this information is presented to the secretary of state or
commissioner of corporations in the state in which the incorporators
choose to establish the legal residence of their enterprise, the state offi-
cial has no discretionary powers. Such officials cannot demand any
additional information; they cannot extract any oath of corporate alle-
giance to "the public interest"; they cannot, with minor exceptions,
even refuse to certify the articles of incorporation. They must sign and
date both copies, keeping one on file, and must issue a receipt (called a
"certificate of incorporation") that attests that the articles of incorpora-
tion have been filed.21
The state does not give life or birth to the corporation. Just as the
registrar of deeds records every sale of land, and the county clerk
records the birth of every baby, so the commissioner of corporations
records the formation of every corporation-nothing more. The func-
tion of the state-to record the creation of corporations-is not essen-
tial to their existence any more than the registrar of births is essential to
the conception or birth of a child.
This mere procedural requirement of filing the articles with a state
official is equated with state creation. Procedural requirements,
though, are not unique to corporations. On the contrary, procedural
requirements apply to virtually all contracts. For example, to be legally
valid, a marriage contract must follow specified procedural require-
ments: it must be performed by someone authorized by the state, it
must be witnessed, and a signed certificate must be filed with the state.
If these requirements make the state a party to a contract, then every
marriage is a manage a trois: bride, groom, and government. Quite
literally, the government plays a smaller role in the creation of a corpo-
ration than of a marriage. Yet who, for that reason, would describe
marriage as a creature of the state or claim that a marriage certificate
contains a promise to serve the public interest? As a legal scholar re-
21. R. STEVENS & H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 307-12 (1965).
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cently noted, "In the literal sense, no 'charter' is now issued to a busi-
ness corporation under the general incorporation laws."
22
The Origin of Corporate Charters
The idea that a corporation receives a charter and that it contains
a promise to serve the state is a carry-over from the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, when the Tudors and Stuarts reigned in England.
Englishmen who wanted to travel or trade overseas had to obtain a
charter-a royal permit-which the king would grant only if he stood
to reap some gain. Freedom of commerce, freedom to join with others
to engage in overseas trade, was viewed as a privilege or concession
that the king could grant or withhold at will. So when persons sought
the king's permission, their petitions contained glowing promises to
serve the king, to bring wealth and glory to his realm.
If Englishmen had tried to act without obtaining a royal charter,
they were subject to prosecution for usurping the sovereign's preroga-
tive, a crime that carried the penalty of imprisonment and forfeiture of
property. In an age when the divine right of kings was the prevailing
political doctrine, individuals wisely avoided provoking the king's
wrath. As a British legal historian observed:
[Ihf they wanted to trade overseas, to depart from the Realm, to take
out ships and men, goods and bullion, it was as well to have the royal
permission in writing ...
Not only would a royal charter be a mark of royal favour
and protection, but it would sanction something which the Crown
would otherwise regard with jealousy and suspicion.23
In other words, individuals found it expedient to justify their request
for charters in terms of benefit to the king so that he would not take
offense at their exercise of commercial freedom. Any other course of
action was inconceivable, because the Tudors and Stuarts did not rec-
ognize the principle of individual rights or freedom of association.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688, which ousted King James II,
repudiated the divine right of kings, and the American Revolution of
1776 sealed its doom. Nonetheless, the concession theory survived, as
did the medieval concept of a charter, by taking on a new meaning. In
the late eighteenth century, after the American Revolution, concessions
and charters signified an exclusive grant to profit by such activities as
building and operating a canal, bridge, wharf, or harbor, or operating a
22. H. SOWARDS, CORPORATION LAW § 1.02 (1974).
23. SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES XV-XVi (C. Carr ed. 1913).
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bank or a water, fire, or street-improvement company. The rationale
for these grants was not to enrich royal favorites but, rather, to en-
courage the investment of private funds to supply quasi-governmental
services.
Businessmen, who otherwise would have formed a partnership, in-
curred the expense of obtaining a corporate charter from a state legisla-
ture. The charter gave them privileges and benefits that were granted
only to corporations. These included a legally enforced monopoly, ex-
emption from taxation, release of employees from militia and jury
duty, power to exercise eminent domain, and authorization to hold lot-
teries as a means of raising capital.24 Corporations in that era, as Pro-
fessor Stuart Bruchey has observed, "were accorded certain exclusive
privileges in order to encourage the devotion of scarce private capital to
public ends."'25
These concessions and charters, however, were denounced as op-
pressive and exploitative. The fiercest critics were the "Jacksonian re-
formers" like William Leggett, Theodore Sedgwick, John Vethake, and
William Gouge. They called for the abolition of all legally protected
monopolies and special privileges, and their viewpoint eventually tri-
umphed. Until that time, however, a corporation required a charter
from the state legislature and, thus, actually was a "creature of the
state."
The Era of General Incorporation Laws
A new era began in 1837 when Connecticut passed the first all-
purpose, general incorporation statute.26 The Act of 1837 established a
standardized, simplified procedure for creating a corporation that other
states copied in later decades. Instead of obtaining a special charter
from the state legislature, the promoters of a corporation only had to
file certain information with an official of the state government. In re-
sponse to decades of anticorporate criticism, the opportunity to incor-
porate was thrown open to nearly every group of would-be business
associates.2 7
24. Bruchey, Corporation" Historical Development, in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC OR-
DER 140-44 (A. Chandler, S. Bruchey & L. Galambos eds. 1968); see J. HURST, THE LEGITI-
MACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at
13-57 (1970).
25. Bruchey, Corporation: Historical Development, in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC OR-
DER 143 (A. Chandler, S. Bruchey & L. Galambos eds. 1968).
26. Similar laws, such as that enacted by New York in 1811, had applied only to com-
panies in specific industries.
27. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 136-38.
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The state legislators really had no other choice. Once public opin-
ion made it impossible for legislatures to continue awarding special
privileges and monopolies, there was no reason for businessmen to seek
state charters of incorporation. The legislators came to realize what
businessmen already knew: corporate features could be acquired with-
out incorporation. In fact, this was a discovery that British business-
men had made in the late seventeenth century. By contract, and
without obtaining governmental permission, British businessmen cre-
ated joint stock associations that offered investors the attraction of
freely transferable shares. They did this merely by copying the struc-
ture of the joint stock companies that held royal or parliamentary char-
ters of incorporation. In 1720, however, Parliament passed the Bubble
Act at the urging of the South Sea Company, a chartered corporation
that resented competition for investor's capital. The Act forbade com-
panies without charters to issue transferable shares or otherwise to imi-
tate corporate features.
The measure backfired, however, and businessmen and barristers
soon devised a second way to acquire corporate features without ob-
taining a charter from Parliament or the crown. They did so by com-
bining two common-law forms: a partnership and a trust. By
designating a few of the potentially numerous partners to be trustees
for all the others, with exclusive authority to make contracts with
outside parties, they concentrated managerial power in a few hands.
Consequently, all the other investors could be offered freely transfera-
ble partnership interests virtually identical to corporate shares. The
success of these unincorporated associations forced Parliament to re-
lent, and in 1844 a permissive enabling act was passed.28
The process was identical in America. Although the Bubble Act
was extended to the American Colonies in 1741, it had no impact. Like
their British counterparts, American businessmen were able to create
corporate features without incorporating. This ability enabled them to
attract millions of dollars from investors for large-scale, long-term en-
terprises, such as textile factories and land-development companies. 29
The commonly held view that today's corporations are descendants of
the chartered corporations is challenged by Professor Shaw Livermore:
28. A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-
1800, at 215-36 (1938); B. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
ENGLAND 1800-1867, at 11-12, 23, 29, 44, 50, 54, 56-57, 87, 94-95, 98 (1936); Gower, Some
Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1956).
29. S. LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON COR-
PORATE DEVELOPMENT 61-69 (1939); 1 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 25-27 (1917).
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It seems to be little realized that unincorporated private business as-
sociations of the eighteenth century, although barred from the legal
status of corporations, approximated the business status and charac-
ter of the modem corporation, both in England and in this coun-
try. .... These business units, and not the old chartered bodies of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, are thus the directprogenitors
of the business corporation of today, which is formed as they were by
private initiative andpossesses apurelyperfunctory and automatic legal
approval.30
For nearly a century, legal scholars have recognized the funda-
mental change from government chartering of corporations to private
contractual creation. They have noted that the concession theory is
now an anachronism, as is the idea that a corporation is awarded a
charter in exchange for a promise to serve the state. In 1900, for exam-
ple, Frederic W. Maitland wrote:
It has become difficult to maintain that the State makes corporations
in any other sense than that in which the State makes marriages
when it declares that people who want to marry can do so by going,
and cannot do so without going, to church or registry. The age of
corporations created by way of "privilege" is passing away.3 1
Similarly, in 1908, a leading American lawyer, Arthur W. Machen, Jr.,
noted:
Always should the fact be recognized that nowadays when the right
to organize a corporation is almost as free as the right to execute a
deed of real estate, corporations are very different things from what
they were when that right was confined to a few favorites of king or
parliament. 32
In 1930, Professor Berle observed how much the concept of incorpora-
tion had changed but how little the change had been integrated into
legal theory:
So large a part of the legal history of corporations was bound up with
actual cases in which the state had granted something-a charter
plus a privilege, as monopolies to trade, the right to run a ferry, the
right to mine gold, etc.,--that the legal concepts are still filled with
survivals of the idea.33
A decisive change had occurred, Berle noted, "from a time when a cor-
poration really did represent a bargain between a group of people and
the state to the time when the state merely granted permission to a
group of people to make an agreement between themselves."' 34 In 1948,
30. Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43 J. POL. ECON.
674 n.2 (1935) (emphasis supplied).
31. Maitland, Introduction, in 0. GmRKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES
xxxviii (1900).
32. 1 A. MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS 18 (1908).
33. A. BERLE, CORPORATION FINANCE 43 (1930).
34. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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Professor Berle began another of his books by stressing the total obso-
lescence of the idea that a charter is a grant of special privileges:
Though the theory has not been seriously overhauled, the hundred
years of corporate development from the middle of the 19th to the
20th Century has revolutionized the nature and content of corporate
creation ...
* * * The economic fact is that a corporate charter is an agree-
ment under which associates can invest their money and act as a
group in an enterprise and along lines which they themselves or their
predecessors devised and accepted. 35
It is ironic, indeed, that Professor Berle, whose writings provide so
much evidence to support a contractual theory of corporations, was the
person who propounded and popularized the idea that giant corpora-
tions are illegitimate because of the separation of ownership and con-
trol. If, as argued here, a corporation is created by private contract,
then it is not clear why some corporations, those giants whose shares
are publicly traded, are expected or exhorted to place public service
ahead of private profit. What justification does Berle offer for the doc-
trine of "social responsibility?"
Examining the Legitimacy of Corporations
Separation of Ownership and Control
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and
Means, like many subsequent writers, invoked the authority of Adam
Smith to prove that giant corporations are not private property nor are
they compatible with capitalism. Adam Smith's defense of private
property and capitalism was based on three assumptions about the typ-
ical business firm: that it would be small-scale, that the individual
owner or small group of owners would invest personal savings in their
business venture, and that they would manage it directly, reaping prof-
its or suffering losses, depending on their own personal managerial
abilities.36
Those who see Adam Smith as a critic of corporations do no more
than create and demolish a straw man. There is no justification for
equating capitalism with a particular configuration of small firms run
by their owners, and Adam Smith's preferences are not binding upon
persons who prefer to create some other arrangement. The essence of
capitalism is the inviolability of individual rights, including the right to
use or invest wealth as one chooses and the right to associate with
35. A. BERLE & W. WARREN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1-2 (1948).
36. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 345-51.
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others for any purpose and under any mutually acceptable terms of
association.
A Comparison of Corporations and Partnerships
In order to demonstrate the legitimacy of the giant publicly traded
corporation-that is, to show that it is private property and that the
officers have not usurped control but are the authorized agents of the
shareholders-it is necessary to examine briefly how a corporation dif-
fers from a partnership. This difference will explain why the separation
of ownership and control is an advantage and attraction of the giant
corporation, not an abuse of the corporate form.
Partnership rests upon two assumptions. The first is that the part-
ners collectively will manage the business; therefore, unless otherwise
agreed, each partner is entitled to an equal voice and vote in decision-
making. The second is that every partner will be a full-time, active
participant in the business; therefore, unless otherwise agreed, partners
owe each other exclusive allegiance, and no one can simultaneously be
a general partner in two firms, regardless of whether they are competi-
tors or not.
From the standpoint of creditors, the distinctive feature of partner-
ship is that every partner is presumed to possess the powers and incur
the obligations of a sole proprietor. Every partner is presumed to be an
authorized agent of the firm, that is, able to sign contracts that are
binding upon all the partners. In addition, each partner is personally
liable for the total debt obligations of the firm. The fact that partners
are mutual agents creates the need to restrict the transferability of part-
nership interests. Otherwise, if a partner could sell or give his interest
to anyone, the other partners would be exposed to great risk: the new
partner would be authorized to sign contracts on behalf of everyone
else. Clearly, partnership is a relationship ill-suited to strangers or to
persons who harbor doubts about each other's intelligence, integrity, or
ability.
The primary difference between corporations and partnerships re-
lates to agency authority. Because partners are mutual agents, restric-
tions are placed on the transferability of partnership interests. On the
other hand, because shareholders are not mutual agents, there is no
need to restrict the transferability of shares. This means that a corpora-
tion's capital can be supplied by hundreds, thousands, or potentially
even millions of investors, each of whom may be a stranger to all the
others.
It also means that a corporation's long-term capital needs can be
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supplied by a steady succession of short-term investors. Although it is
fashionable to disparage short-term investors as being speculators
whose buying and selling of shares serves no useful or productive func-
tion, the exact opposite is true. They provide liquidity for any existing
investor who needs or wants to sell out. Free transferability creates
instant liquidity. There is no need to obtain the other owners' approval
of a prospective buyer, as is necessary to admit a new general partner,
and there is no time period to wait before one can sell one's shares, nor
any penalty for early withdrawal. Instead, each investor can retain
ownership of shares for as long or as little time as desired. It is hard to
imagine a more equitable or attractive arrangement.
Ownersho without Control by Choice
According to Berle and Means, the increase in the number of cor-
porate shareholders led to a separation of ownership and control. That
claim is wrong, however, because it reverses cause and effect. It was the
separation of ownership and control-that is, the creation of two dis-
tinct functions (investment and management)-that made possible the
increased number of shareholders. The corporate form flourished pre-
cisely because it split the atom of ownership into two parts. Unlike
general partners, corporate shareholders are not mutual agents and do
not automatically play an active role in managing the business. Con-
versely, the officers, executives, and managers need not be owner-inves-
tors. It is a beneficial relationship for all concerned.
Critics of giant corporations contend that the shareholders are in-
active because they have been denied access to information about cor-
porate activities. There is another explanation, however, for their
inactivity: it is a deliberate decision for most shareholders. They are
attracted to corporate shares precisely because they will not be required
to participate in managerial decision-making. What they seek is a side-
line investment, an opportunity to entrust some of their savings to man-
agerial specialists in return for a share of the resulting profits.
The "separation of ownership and control" in giant corporations is
frequently denounced, yet it merely represents a widening specializa-
tion of function or division of labor. There is no reason why a share-
holder must personally manage his own money. If he wants to supply
both capital and managerial services, he can become a sole proprietor
or a general partner. Why should anyone else protest, however, if he
decides to rely upon the managerial expertise of others? Such invest-
ment is analogous to what a person does in depositing money in a sav-
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ings bank, or becoming a limited partner, or buying shares in a mutual
fund, or purchasing corporate bonds.
Just as most investors do not seek to exercise managerial authority,
so, too, when a corporation goes public, the founding officers and their
successors do not intend to relinquish their decision-making powers.
For example, when Walt Disney, Edwin Land, and Thomas J. Watson
sold stock in their companies to outsiders, they were seeking capital,
not advice on how to produce cartoons, cameras, or computers. New
investors were never led to believe that they were acquiring managerial
powers equivalent to those of general partners. If the relationship be-
tween shareholders and corporate officers is mutually acceptable, if
millions of people willingly invest in corporations that they will not
personally manage, then critics have no right to interfere.
To denounce the largest corporations because shareholders do not
directly control their policies or select the officers-to say that they
should, that they must because they are the owners-ignores the fact
that owners do not exercise any control in some other leading forms of
business organization. Limited partners, for example, are owners, yet
they have no voice or vote in setting business policy. Those who
purchase certificates in business trusts exercise no control. Like share-
holders, trust beneficiaries obtain freely transferable shares with lim-
ited liability, but, unlike shareholders, they acquire no voting rights.
Investment without control is not an evil 4f the owners freely consent to
that relationship. Rather, it is an example of what has been called
"capitalist acts between consenting adults. '37
Far from receiving too little information, most shareholders are
deliberately inactive and uninvolved because it takes too much time to
study the information already available to them. A small-scale investor
may have other, more personal and urgent interests to pursue, rather
than studying the financial and statistical data sent by each of the cor-
porations whose shares are owned. Time and energy are scarce re-
sources, and, quite rationally, a person will concentrate attention on
those areas of life where the effects of a poor decision will be most
intensely experienced. Thus, the more widely a person diversifies an
investment portfolio, the less incentive there is to closely monitor each
situation.
The primary safeguard for shareholders of giant corporations is
their ability instantly to sell their shares. The stock market functions as
a daily plebiscite, enabling investors to register their individual reac-
37. Nozick, Distributive Justice, 3 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 45, 59 (1973).
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tions without needing to be members of a majority voting coalition.
Professor Henry G. Manne has shown that if the officers pursue poli-
cies that offend or disappoint a substantial number of shareholders, the
officers will be undermining their own position. A massive exodus or
sell-off by disgruntled shareholders will depress the price of the stock
and thus make it attractive for "corporate raiders" to attempt a take-
over.38 Professor Burton G. Malkiel concurs:
A company that has been run by a management group whose major
objective is not the well-being of the shareholders will become a
prime target for a take-over bid. The ever present threat of such a
bid is likely to provide a powerful incentive for management to make
the maximization of the shareholders' wealth a primary goal of the
firm.
3 9
Today a medium-size corporate giant, such as Coca-Cola or Bris-
tol-Myers, has 60,000 shareholders, while General Motors has
1,400,000 and American Telephone and Telegraph has nearly three
million. Unlike general partners who are intimate acquaintances, to-
day's shareholders are strangers to each other, residents of all fifty
states and more than 100 different nations. If persons today living in
Alaska, Arizona, Austria, or Australia buy shares in General Motors or
U.S. Steel, they don't expect to be consulted as if they were general
partners.
When shares can be easily traded through stock exchanges, it is
fairer to all parties if those who disapprove of the policies initiated by
the officers simply sell their shares. Given the low cost of selling one's
shares and switching one's funds to another corporation or to some
other investment opportunity, it is hardly surprising that dissatisfied in-
vestors prefer to sell, instead of expending time and energy to form a
coalition of shareholders to oust the existing officers and directors. A
policy of "love it or leave it" makes perfect sense when there are 14,000
publicly traded corporations (including those traded over the counter)
to choose among. Anyone whose professed goal is to give shareholders
the widest possible range of choices would be unable to conceive of or
to create the stock exchange system that spontaneously evolved over
the past century. Far from being the antithesis of free choice and con-
tinuous accountability, the publicly traded giant corporation is the
highest embodiment and expression of those ideals.
38. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110
(1965).
39. B. MALKIEL, DEBT-EQUITY COMBINATION OF THE FIRM AND THE COST OF CAPI-
TAL 4 (1972).
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Agency Authority of Corporate Officers
One last issue needs to be clarified. It is possible to agree that most
shareholders do not want to participate in managerial decision-making
and that they are better off financially if they function as passive inves-
tors. Nonetheless, one might argue that the benefit to shareholders
does not excuse or justify the usurpation of control by the corporate
officers. If the officers are a self-perpetuating oligarchy, #they exercise
control without authorization from those whose money they manage, it
hardly matters that the shareholders are the beneficiaries of a system of
despotism. But is this true? Do the officers operate without authoriza-
tion from the shareholders?
Ralph Nader contends that officers are not authorized agents. He
writes:
In nearly every large American business corporation, there exists a
management autocracy. One man-variously titled the President, or
the Chairman of the Board, or the Chief Executive Officer-or a
small coterie of men rule the corporation. Far from being chosen by
the directors to run the corporation, this chief executive or executive
clique chooses the board of directors and, with the acquiescence of
the board, controls the corporation.U°
According to Nader, the shareholders want to be in control, to play an
active role in determining corporate goals and in designing the strategy
to achieve those goals. Because the officers do not want anyone to in-
terfere with their autocratic powers, however, they deliberately with-
hold information that shareholders need to make intelligent policy
decisions. The officers will not relinquish their autocratic powers vol-
untarily and, under today's system of state incorporation laws, they
cannot be forced to do so. The states, says Nader, have been co-con-
spirators; they have favored the officers at the expense of the sharehold-
ers. Instead of enforcing a code that requires officers to carry out only
those policies initiated by the shareholders or expressly approved by
them, the states have permitted corporate officers to exercise vast dis-
cretionary powers.4'
Moreover, Nader argues that the pattern of corporate democracy
is mandatory, not optional:
All modem state corporation statutes describe a common image of
corporate governance, an image pyramidal in form. At the base of
the pyramid are the shareholders or owners of the corporation....
The intermediate level is held by the board of directors, who are re-
40. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 75-76
(1976).
41. Id. at 80-102.
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quired by a provision common to nearly every state corporation law
"to manage the business and affairs of the corporation." . . . Fi-
nally, at the apex of the pyramid are the corporate officers. In the
eyes of the law, the officers are the employees of the shareholder
owners. Their authority is limited to those responsibilities which the
directors delegate to them. 42
He condemns the states for not enforcing adherence to this pattern: "In
reality, this legal image is virtually a myth. '43
Nader's criticism rests upon two false assumptions. First, he as-
sumes that the state incorporation laws are prescriptive, setting forth a
norm that must be adhered to; instead, they are suppletory, setting forth
a norm that applies only if no agreement to modify the norm has been
made. (The laws of partnership and of intestacy serve exactly the same
purpose.) As long as no one is being coerced or defrauded, any pattern
should be permissible.
Second, he assumes that the pattern described in the state incorpo-
ration statutes must be eternal and unalterable. His own summary,
though, indicates that deviations from the statutory norm are possible
by stating that the authority of the officers "is limited to those responsi-
bilities which the directors delegate to them."44 Nothing in that state-
ment implies a static pattern. When a business is first incorporated, the
same small group of individuals is likely to be simultaneously the
shareholders, directors, and officers. The owners of the most shares al-
most certainly will elect themselves to serve as the directors, and then,
acting as directors, they will elect officers from amongst themselves.
Given this close relationship, it is possible-indeed, likely-that the
corporate president will exercise discretionary authority.
The president can acquire discretionary authority in several ways.
One is by an explicit grant from the directors. Another is by making an
unauthorized exercise of authority-for example, by signing a contract
with an outside party, even though the articles of incorporation and by-
laws give no such authority. If the directors subsequently approve the
unauthorized act, however, they have ratified it, giving retroactive au-
thority to the president. If the newly asserted authority becomes a rati-
fied power of the president, it usually automatically passes to successors
in office. Nothing about this procedure is fraudulent or illegal. The
concept of ratification is central in the law of agency, which, in turn, is
a crucial element of the law of property and contracts.
There is a third and far more common way in which corporate
42. Id. at 75.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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presidents acquire discretionary authority. The language of the by-
laws is usually very general and unrestrictive, stating, for example, that
the president shall be "chief executive officer." The exact meaning of
that phrase is rarely, if ever, fully explained. Instead, the president
usually acts according to personal judgment of what is beneficial to the
business, and, depending on the degree of confidence of the directors,
the president may or may not give them frequent or detailed reports on
operating decisions. In companies where the president is the founder
or principal shareholder, the directors are well aware that the president
is handling certain types of situations without consulting them, and
rarely do they either ratify or repudiate such decisions. Situations in
which the directors rebuke the president for exercising authority with-
out their approval are so rare as to be noteworthy.45
There is no uniform rule about presidential authority that prevails
throughout the business world. Instead, the exercise of discretionary
authority varies from industry to industry, and even companies in the
same industry do not necessarily abide by the same custom. The exer-
cise of discretionary authority by the president is rarely challenged by a
disgruntled shareholder suing to undo the consequences, so there are
relatively few judicial decisions on the scope of presidential authority.
When the corporation later "goes public," it is not morally or le-
gally necessary to ask the new shareholders to approve the president's
past exercises of discretionary authority. Their share purchases involve
a contract of adhesion. They implicitly agree to accept all of the corpo-
ration's existing contractual relationships including delegations of au-
thority. The new shareholders have no basis for complaint; they have
not been deceived or defrauded. Their shares are private property, and
the officers are acting as authorized agents of the owners.
Conclusion
The alleged illegitimacy of giant publicly traded corporations is a
conclusion that can be reached only by ignoring obvious facts and sub-
stituting for them the critic's personal vision of what the shareholders
should want. Millions of people have an ownership interest in
America's giant corporations, either directly through purchase of shares
or indirectly through pension funds, insurance companies, and other
financial intermediaries. Critics who claim to be speaking on their be-
half have offered no evidence that shareholders want or need the "re-
45. For a famous example of a president being censured by the board for exceeding his
authority, see R. HESSEN, STEEL TITAN: THE LIFE OF CHARLES M. SCHWAB 128 (1975).
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forms" that are demanded in their name. The critics certainly have not
shown that shareholders endorse "social responsibility," if that means
placing public service ahead of private profit.
If there is any justification for the concept of "social responsibil-
ity," it cannot be found either in the concession theory or in the separa-
tion of ownership and control. The giant corporation is private
property; it is a voluntary association created and sustained by an exer-
cise of freedom of contract. Its right to function freely on an equal
footing with other organizations and associations requires no further
justification.46
46. On all of the issues treated briefly in this essay and on many other criticisms of
corporations, see the author's book, R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979).
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